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I. INTRODUCTION
In Riley v. California, the United States Supreme Court held that a
warrant is generally required for law enforcement to search a cell
phone seized incident to a suspect’s arrest.1 Although this mandate
seems clear,2 the Court did not outline what law enforcement must
include in a cell phone search warrant to comport with the probable
cause and particularity requirements of the Fourth Amendment.3 As a
result, state courts are left to determine when cell phone search war-
rants satisfy the Fourth Amendment.4 In applying Riley and analyz-
ing the validity of cell phone search warrants, the Nebraska Supreme
Court has tried to balance law enforcement’s need for evidence against
citizens’ privacy interests in an increasingly digital age.5 Unfortu-
nately, in its most recent case on this issue, State v. Goynes, the court
failed to properly balance these conflicting interests.6
In Goynes, a criminal defendant challenged the district court’s re-
fusal to suppress evidence that police recovered from a search of his
cell phone, arguing the authorizing search warrant violated the
Fourth Amendment.7 Despite the shortcomings of the warrant, the
Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s admission of the
cell phone evidence, holding the warrant was supported by probable
cause and sufficiently particular.8
This Note aims to articulate the shortcomings of the court’s deci-
sion in Goynes and the impact it has on Fourth Amendment protec-
tions in Nebraska. Part II of this Note will discuss the increased
presence of cell phones in American society and rising privacy con-
1. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 401 (2014).
2. Id. at 403 (“Our answer to the question of what police must do before searching a
cell phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a warrant.”).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.”).
4. See William Clark, Protecting the Privacies of Digital Life: Riley v. California, the
Fourth Amendment’s Particularity Requirement, and Search Protocols for Cell
Phone Search Warrants, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1981, 1997 (2015) (discussing the limited
scope of the Court’s holding in Riley v. California and the responsibility of state
courts to determine when cell phone search warrants comply with the Fourth
Amendment).
5. See State v. Henderson, 289 Neb. 271, 289, 854 N.W.2d 616, 633 (2014) (analyz-
ing the sufficiency of a cell phone search warrant for the first time post-Riley v.
California and noting that “the privacy interests at stake in a search of a cell
phone” require searches to be “sufficiently limited in scope” according to the
Fourth Amendment).
6. State v. Goynes, 303 Neb. 129, 927 N.W.2d 346 (2019).
7. Id. at 131, 927 N.W.2d at 349.
8. Id. at 144, 927 N.W.2d at 357.
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cerns as cell phones become more advanced.9 Additionally, Part II will
discuss how the law governing search warrants has developed over
time and the ongoing difficulty courts have had in applying traditional
Fourth Amendment principles to advancing technology.10 Finally,
Part II will discuss State v. Goynes, the Nebraska Supreme Court’s
most recent failure regarding cell phone search warrants.11 Part III
will discuss how the decision in Goynes established a dangerous prece-
dent for lower courts to authorize broad, boilerplate cell phone search
warrants that will expose Nebraska citizens to unreasonable searches
in direct violation of the Fourth Amendment.12 Part III will also offer
an alternative approach to evaluating cell phone search warrants.13
II. BACKGROUND
A. Cell Phone Use & Consumers’ Expectations of Privacy
Cell phones have become a staple of the American lifestyle. Ap-
proximately 96% of Americans own a cell phone, as compared to just
84% of Americans in 2008.14 The overwhelming majority of these indi-
viduals own smartphones.15 As technology advances, the frequency at
which individuals use their cell phones and the amount of sensitive
information they store and access on their cell phones is also exponen-
tially increasing.16
9. See infra section II.A.
10. See infra section II.B.
11. See infra section II.C.
12. See infra section III.A.
13. See infra section III.B.
14. Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (June 12, 2019), https://www.pewinternet.org/f/
mobile/ [https://perma.unl.edu/YP76-R6CE].
15. Id. (finding that of the 96% of Americans who owned cell phones in 2019, 81% of
those individuals owned a smartphone).
16. See CTIA, ANNUAL SURVEY HIGHLIGHTS 1, 2–3 (2019), https://api.ctia.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2019/06/2019-Annual-Survey-Highlights-FINAL.pdf [https://
per.unl.edu/3KFL-5X56] (finding that U.S. wireless data use is up over seventy-
three times since 2010, and that from 2017 to 2018 alone there was an 82%
growth in mobile data use, a 9.6% growth in the number of minutes consumers
spent talking on their mobile devices (totaling 2.4 trillion minutes), and a 15.8%
growth in the number of text messages exchanged (totaling 5.5 billion texts sent
per day)); Monica Anderson, 6 Facts About Americans and Their Smartphones,
PEW RES. CTR.: FACT TANK (Apr. 1, 2015), https://PewResearch-org-preprod.go-
vip.co/fact-tank/2015/04/01/6-facts-about-americans-and-their-smartphones/
[https://perma.unl.edu/Z2KK-CET2] (concluding that in as early as 2014,
smartphone users were using their cell phones accordingly: 97% for text messag-
ing, 92% for voice/video calls, 88% for email, 75% for social networking, 60% for
taking pictures/videos, 62% to get information about a health condition, and 57%
to do online banking).
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In Riley, the Court explained that a standard sixteen gigabyte de-
vice can hold millions of text messages and documents.17 In the six
years since Riley was decided, cell phone storage capabilities have
drastically increased—with the top-selling cell phone of 2018 having
up to 256 gigabytes of storage—allowing consumers to store even
more private data on their devices.18 The amount of private informa-
tion accessible from a smartphone is even greater as more individuals
use “the Cloud,”19 which allows the user—and police—to access data
that is not stored directly on the cell phone from the device.20 In addi-
tion to their massive storage capacities, cell phones have become so
intertwined with human existence that some philosophers and cogni-
tive researchers argue smartphones are actually an extension of an
individual’s mind worthy of protection from intrusion.21 One re-
searcher concluded that “unlocking our devices is not simply like un-
locking our house” but “is more like opening up our minds,” and
therefore, forcing individuals to do so without proper safeguards is a
breach of mental autonomy.22
17. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 394 (2014) (“The current top-selling smart
phone has a standard capacity of 16 gigabytes (and is available with up to 64
gigabytes). Sixteen gigabytes translates to millions of pages of text, thousands of
pictures, or hundreds of videos.”). The Court in Riley also acknowledged that
“data on the phone can date back for years.” Id. at 375.
18. See Jeb Su, The iPhone X Was the World’s Best Selling Smartphone in Q1 2018,
FORBES (June 13, 2018, 2:29 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeanbaptiste/
2018/06/13/the-iphone-x-was-the-worlds-best-selling-smartphone-in-q1-2018/#
2589cbd77d2f [https://perma.unl.edu/M3Z3-FP3V]; iPhone X - Technical Specifi-
cations, APPLE (Aug. 9, 2019), https://support.apple.com/kb/sp770?locale=EN_US
[https://perma.unl.edu/3HYU-N33A] (showing the iPhone X is available with ei-
ther 64 or 256 gigabytes of storage capacity).
19. Cisco Systems, Forecast Number of Personal Cloud Storage Consumers/Users
Worldwide from 2014 to 2020, STATISTA (Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.statista.com/
statistics/499558/worldwide-personal-cloud-storage-users/ [https://perma.
unl.edu/3MEQ-XS24] (estimating that approximately 1.8 billion people world-
wide would use cloud storage in 2017 with that number continuing to grow into
2020).
20. See Riley, 573 U.S. at 397–98 (acknowledging that cell phones can be used to
“access data located elsewhere” with the use of “cloud computing,” providing an-
other reason for heightened privacy protections when it comes to cell phone




ing iCloud backup and what data from a cell phone can be backed up to the
Cloud, including app data, text messages, photos, videos, etc.).
21. See, e.g., Karina Vold, Is Your Smartphone an Extension of Your Mind?, VICE
(Mar. 2, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/qvemgb/is-your-
smartphone-an-extension-of-your-mind [https://perma.unl.edu/ZR6M-Z8Z4].
22. Michael Lynch, Leave My iPhone Alone: Why Our Smartphones Are Extensions of
Ourselves, GUARDIAN (Feb. 19, 2016, 5:29 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2016/feb/19/iphone-apple-privacy-smartphones-extension-of-ourselves
[https://perma.unl.edu/KVU4-V7C8].
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In light of these technological developments, debates about cell
phones and privacy rights have catapulted into the center of the na-
tional stage. Most famously, a court case about how much power law
enforcement should have to force providers and manufacturers like
Apple to unlock encrypted cell phones23 exploded into a controversy
that divided the nation.24 This debate illustrated the rise of an under-
lying national sentiment: cell phone data is so private that the govern-
ment should not be able to access or monitor it, even for anti-terrorism
efforts.25 Cell phone privacy concerns have also resulted in citizens
seeking technological protections to prevent law enforcement from
searching their phones, and some major cell phone manufacturers
have answered this call.26 It is with this information about cell phone
storage capabilities, along with the understanding of just how impor-
tant citizens believe cell phone privacy to be, that the legal community
must approach the discussion of cell phone search warrants.
23. See Jack Nicas, Apple to Close iPhone Security Hole that Law Enforcement Uses
to Crack Devices, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com//06/13/
technology/apple-iphone-police.html [https://perma.unl.edu/64DU-R5] (discuss-
ing the infamous case where Apple, in efforts to preserve its customers’ privacy,
refused to help the F.B.I. unlock the iPhone of a man suspected of killing fourteen
people in a mass shooting). Apple’s resistance eventually led to the F.B.I. drop-
ping its legal action and paying a private third-party $1.3 million to unlock the
phone, causing Apple to pursue new features to prevent future government hack-
ing. Id.; see also Associated Press v. FBI, 265 F. Supp. 3d 82, 89–90 (2017) (“After
initially commencing legal action against the phone’s manufacturer, Apple, to
compel its assistance in accessing the phone, the FBI moved to stay the proceed-
ings in March 2016 when an ‘outside party demonstrated to the FBI a possible
method for unlocking Farook’s iPhone.’” (citations omitted)).
24. See CBS News Poll: Americans Split on Unlocking San Bernardino Shooter’s
iPhone, CBS NEWS (Mar. 18, 2016, 8:24 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/cbs-
news-poll-americans-split-on-unlocking-san-bernardino-shooters-iphone/ [https://
perma.unl.edu/2BGJ-UCAY].
25. See, e.g., Most Americans Think the Government Could Be Monitoring Their
Phone Calls and Emails, PEW RES. CTR.: FACT TANK (Sept. 27, 2017), https://
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/09/27/most-americans-think-the-gov-be-
monitoring-their-phone-calls-and-emails/ [https://perma.unl.edu/-C23A] (finding
that 70% of Americans believe their phone calls and emails are likely being moni-
tored by the government and that 54% of Americans “disapprove[ ] of the govern-
ment’s collection of telephone and internet data as a part of anti-terrorism
efforts”).
26. See April Glaser, The Next iOS Update Has a Feature to Prevent Cops from
Searching Your iPhone, SLATE (Aug. 18, 2017, 2:06 PM), https://slate.com//2017/
08/the-new-iphone-update-will-help-prevent-cops-from-searchin-locked-device.
html [https://perma.unl.edu/QZP8-HRQ2] (discussing new technology that allows
users to disable fingerprint access to their cell phone, preventing police from forc-
ing them to unlock their cell phones with their fingerprints); Nicas, supra note
23.
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B. Fourth Amendment Overview & Evolution of Search
Warrant Requirements in Response to Technology
Both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
the first Article of the Nebraska Constitution provide that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.27
The Founding Fathers’ motivation for including this language in the
Constitution is clear—citizens need to be protected from “general war-
rants” which would allow the government to engage in exploratory
rummaging of an individual’s possessions.28 Modern courts emphasize
this policy rationale when analyzing Fourth Amendment issues.29 To
protect against exploratory rummaging, searches conducted by police
without a warrant “are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-deline-
ated exceptions.”30
The second clause of the Fourth Amendment provides that war-
rants must meet two requirements: (1) warrants must be supported by
probable cause, and (2) warrants must be sufficiently particular in
describing “the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.”31 In applying these Fourth Amendment requirements, the
Nebraska Supreme Court has held: “Probable cause sufficient to jus-
tify issuance of a search warrant means a fair probability that contra-
band or evidence of a crime will be found.”32 Affidavits alleging facts
27. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 7; see also State v. Baker, 298 Neb.
216, 226, 903 N.W.2d 469, 477 (2017) (reinforcing the long-standing practice of
construing “the Nebraska Constitution in lockstep with the U.S. Supreme Court’s
construction of the U.S. Constitution”).
28. Amdt. 4.1 Fourth Amendment: Historical Background, CONST. ANNOTATED,
https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt4-1/ALDE_00000774/ [https:/
/perma.unl.edu/3SZX-F7XV] (last visited Sept. 14, 2020) (discussing the history
of general warrants executed in furtherance of the King of England’s reign and
the influence of such incidents on the development of Fourth Amendment).
29. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583–86 (1980); Baker, 298 Neb. at
227–28, 903 N.W.2d at 477–78; State v. Sprunger, 283 Neb. 531, 539, 811 N.W.2d
235, 243 (2012).
30. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnotes omitted); accord Riley
v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 381–82 (2014); see also 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 4.1(b) (5th ed. 2018) (out-
lining the primary exceptions to the per se requirement of a search warrant in-
cluding consent to the search, searches incident to arrest, exigent circumstances,
and the automobile exception).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
32. Sprunger, 283 Neb. at 537, 811 N.W.2d at 242; see also State v. Prahin, 235 Neb.
409, 418–19, 455 N.W.2d 554, 561 (1990) (holding that to establish probable
cause “there must ‘be a nexus between the item to be seized and criminal behav-
ior’” (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967))).
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from police investigations are used to establish probable cause.33
When evaluating if an affidavit provides sufficient probable cause to
support a warrant, “[t]he question is whether, under the totality of the
circumstances illustrated by the affidavit, the issuing magistrate had
a substantial basis for finding that the affidavit established probable
cause.”34
As for particularity, the U.S. Supreme Court35 and the Nebraska
Supreme Court have held that “[a] warrant satisfies the particularity
requirement if it leaves nothing about its scope to the discretion of the
officer serving it” in order to prevent “overseizure and oversearch-
ing.”36 Courts, however, have not taken literally the requirement that
a warrant leave “nothing” to the officer’s discretion. Instead, this lan-
guage is widely interpreted to mean that “a warrant must be suffi-
ciently particular to prevent the officer from having unlimited or
unreasonably broad discretion in determining what items to seize.”37
Therefore, when analyzing particularity and the officers’ discretion,
courts must always circle back to the question of whether the descrip-
tion of the things to be seized is so broad that it “constitutes a general
exploratory warrant.”38
Although probable cause and particularity are distinct require-
ments, the two are closely related.39 In describing this relationship,
the Nebraska Supreme Court held that “[a]warrant may be suffi-
ciently particular even though it describes the items to be seized in
broad or generic terms if the description is as particular as the sup-
porting evidence will allow, but the broader the scope of a warrant, the
stronger the evidentiary showing must be to establish probable
cause.”40
Applying these Fourth Amendment principles to advancing tech-
nology—particularly cell phones—has proven to be a difficult task.
One of the earliest and most primitive questions the United States
Supreme Court addressed in Olmstead v. United States was how, if it
33. State v. Edmonson, 257 Neb. 468, 476, 598 N.W.2d 450, 457 (1999) (“To be valid,
a search warrant must be supported by an affidavit establishing probable cause.”
(citing State v. Johnson, 256 Neb. 133, 589 N.W.2d 108 (1999))).
34. Sprunger, 283 Neb. at 537, 811 N.W.2d at 242.
35. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927).
36. State v. Henderson, 289 Neb. 271, 289, 854 N.W.2d 616, 633 (2014).
37. State v. Baker, 298 Neb. 216, 228–29, 903 N.W.2d 469, 478 (2017); see also
LAFAVE, supra note 30, at § 4.6(a) (discussing particularity and how the Supreme
Court’s requirement that “nothing” be left to the discretion of officers is not to be
read literally).
38. See LAFAVE, supra note 30, at § 4.6(a).
39. Sprunger, 283 Neb. at 540, 811 N.W.2d at 243 (“The requirement of particularity
for a search warrant is closely related to the requirement of probable cause.”); see
also LAFAVE, supra note 30, at § 4.6(a) (discussing the intertwined analysis when
assessing probable cause and particularity).
40. Baker, 298 Neb. at 228, 903 N.W.2d at 478.
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all, the Fourth Amendment would extend to protect against unreason-
able searches of telephone communications.41 The Court held that in-
tercepting an individual’s telephone calls (wiretapping) was not a
search that required a warrant under the Fourth Amendment because
the government did not physically invade the individual’s effects or
curtilage.42 This decision was later overruled by Katz v. United States,
in which the Court held the Fourth Amendment protects “people
rather than places;” therefore, the warrantless interception of Katz’s
conversation, even in a public phone booth, was unreasonable and vio-
lated the Constitution.43
Although seizing a cell phone and searching its contents is more
clearly a physical intrusion of an effect than intercepting a phone call,
these cases represent an important leap in the Court’s reasoning as it
began to grapple with citizens’ “reasonable expectation of privacy” in
relation to technology and non-tangible data.44 The holding in Katz—
departing from former precedent to find that an individual’s expecta-
tion of privacy evolves and can be defeated by an electronic inva-
sion45—was also a call on the judicial system to continually question
and determine the application of the Fourth Amendment in cases in-
volving advancing technology.46
41. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
42. Id. at. 466.
43. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351, 353. The Court’s analysis in this case illustrates the early
tension that arose when determining how to apply Fourth Amendment principles
to emerging technology. Previously, the Fourth Amendment was exclusively in-
voked by the Court to protect citizens from physical intrusions (or trespasses) of
protected areas such as homes, barns, and effects. Id. at 352–53; see also United
States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405–06 (2012) (discussing the Fourth Amendment’s
deep connection to physical property rights and common-law trespass).
44. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 360–62 (Harlan, J., concurring) (explaining that whether
the Fourth Amendment provides protection from search and seizure in a particu-
lar situation depends on whether “a person have [sic] exhibited an actual (subjec-
tive) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society
is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’”; further, “reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy may be defeated by electronic as well as physical invasion”); see also Jones,
565 U.S. at 406–09 (discussing the reasonable expectation of privacy standard
formulated in Katz and how it “added to” the common-law trespassory test to
recognize invasions prohibited by the Fourth Amendment that extend past physi-
cal property invasions).
45. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
46. See Christopher Michels, What’s in the Box? Re-Conceptualizing Computers as
Containers, Metadata as Contents of that Container, and Applying Fourth
Amendment Protections, 3 CRIM. L. PRAC. 5, 30–32 (2016) (“As technology
changes, the reasonable expectation of privacy using technology will likely
change as well.”); Erica L. Danielsen, Note, Cell Phone Searches After Riley: Es-
tablishing Probable Cause and Applying Search Warrant Exceptions, 36 PACE L.
REV. 970, 973–74 (2016) (discussing how technology has evolved citizens’ reason-
able expectation of privacy and arguing that “the United States judicial system is
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Since Katz, state courts have struggled to answer this call and de-
termine how the Fourth Amendment applies to technological advance-
ments. Initially, state courts categorized cell phones—specifically
early generation cell phones—as “containers” of electronic information
and, using the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Robinson,
upheld warrantless searches of such cell phones as lawful “searches
incident to arrest.”47 As cell phones began storing more data, however,
a circuit split, as well as a contentious legal debate, emerged as to
whether cell phones and containers were truly analogous.48 Eventu-
ally, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Riley v. California to
address this split and decide whether warrantless searches of cell
phones incident to arrest were, in fact, constitutional.49 The Court’s
obligated to continue to interpret and adapt the Fourth Amendment to conform to
the advancements in society”).
47. In United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 226 (1973) (citations omitted), the
Supreme Court held that “[w]hen an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the ar-
resting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that
the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape” and that
it is also “entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any
evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or destruc-
tion.” Applying this standard, the Court held the officers were authorized to
search a container (specifically, a cigarette carton) found in the arrestee’s pocket
without a warrant or additional probable cause. Id. at 235–36. The Court in New
York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (footnotes omitted) extended the parame-
ters of lawful searches incident to arrest holding that “when a policeman has
made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may . . . ex-
amine the contents of any containers found within the passenger compartment.”
Soon, courts across the country began relying on Robinson and Belton to find
warrantless searches of cell phones and their digital contents to be lawful
searches incident to arrest, analogizing cell phones as “containers” of electronic
information. See, e.g., People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 507–08 (2011) (alteration in
original) (“[T]ravelers who carry sophisticated cell phones have no greater right
to conceal personal information from official inspection than travelers who carry
such information in ‘small spatial container[s].’ . . .  [D]iffering expectations of
privacy based on the amount of information a particular item contains should
also be irrelevant.”), abrogated by Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014); see
also Adam M. Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets the Fourth Amendment, 56 UCLA L.
REV. 27, 38–40 (2008) (discussing lower court cases that relied on Robinson and
Belton to hold that warrantless searches of cell phones were lawful searches inci-
dent to arrest).
48. See Adam M. Gershowitz, The Post-Riley Search Warrant: Search Protocols and
Particularity in Cell Phone Searches, 69 VAND. L. REV. 585, 595 (2016) (discuss-
ing the circuit split that emerged “among federal courts and a handful of state
courts” concerning warrantless searches of cell phones incident to arrest);
Charles E. MacLean, But, Your Honor, a Cell Phone Is Not a Cigarette Pack: An
Immodest Call for a Return to the Chimel Justifications for Cell Phone Memory
Searches Incident to Lawful Arrest, 6 FED. CTS. L. REV. 41, 43–44 (2012) (discuss-
ing the small circuit split concerning whether cell phones could be constitution-
ally searched incident to arrest and arguing that the Supreme Court should find
cell phones are not analogous to containers).
49. Riley, 573 U.S. 373. In this case, the Court addressed two separate appeals both
dealing with warrantless searches of cell phones incident to arrest. In the first
486 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:477
decision was unanimous and unequivocally clear: “Our answer to the
question of what police must do before searching a cell phone seized
incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a warrant.”50
In coming to this conclusion, the Court explained that cell phones
are vastly different from other objects or containers that may be found
on an arrestee, especially since modern cell phones are much less like
a telephone and much more like a “minicomputer.”51 Accordingly, the
Court asserted that searching the contents of an individual’s cell
phone, on most occasions, would reveal more personal information
than a search of one’s entire home.52 Since cell phones hold these
“privacies of life,” the Court acknowledged that in many cases citizens
have a reasonable expectation of privacy when it comes to their cell
phones.53 The Court’s decision to protect cell phone privacy was met
with widespread support from individuals in the legal profession54
and in the media.55
case, the defendant was stopped for a traffic violation and the incident ended in
police arresting him for a weapons charge. In a search incident to his arrest, po-
lice discovered a cell phone in his pants pocket which they seized and later
searched. Evidence uncovered from the cell phone, including photos and videos,
led to the State charging the defendant in connection with an unsolved shooting.
The State also sought an enhanced sentence based on evidence of gang member-
ship that was uncovered during the search of the cell phone. The defendant filed
a motion to suppress the evidence retrieved from the cell phone which the trial
court denied. The California Court of Appeal upheld the decision, and the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari. In the second case, police arrested the defendant
for participating in a drug sale. In a search incident to his arrest, police uncov-
ered a cell phone and observed incoming calls from a contact named “my house.”
Police then traced the number to find his home address and executed a warrant
to search the premises. Police found drugs and firearms in the home, and the
defendant was arrested for possession of those items. The defendant challenged
the trial court’s admission of the evidence obtained from his cell phone. Id. at 373.
50. Id. at 403.
51. Id. at 393 (“[Cell phones] could just as easily be called cameras, video players,
rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps,
or newspapers.”).
52. Id. at 396–97 (“[A] cell phone search would typically expose to the government far
more than the most exhaustive search of a house: A phone not only contains in
digital form many sensitive records previously found in the home; it also contains
a broad array of private information never found in a home in any form—unless
the phone is.”).
53. Id. at 403 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886)).
54. See, e.g., Richard M. Re, Symposium: Inaugurating the Digital Fourth Amend-
ment, SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2014, 12:37 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/
06/symposium-inaugurating-the-digital-fourth-amendment [https://perma.unl.
edu/QX3T-6KLG] (asserting that “Riley will be remembered as the inauguration
of a new era of Fourth Amendment doctrine” and that the decision is “the privacy
gift that keeps on giving”).
55. See, e.g., Ben Goad, Court on Cellphone Search: ‘Get a Warrant,’ HILL (June 25,
2014, 8:34 PM), https://thehill.com/regulation/court-battles/210518-roberts-court-
on-cell-phone-searches-get-a-warrant [https://perma.unl.edu/CWG8-XC9F] (not-
ing that the Riley case was being described “as a ‘revolutionary’ victory for pri-
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Despite early applause for the Court’s decision,56 it quickly became
apparent that the seemingly unambiguous mandate—that law en-
forcement must have a warrant to search a cell phone—was difficult
to implement without a methodology for lower courts to use when de-
termining whether a cell phone search warrant is supported by proba-
ble cause and sufficiently particular.57 As courts have struggled with
these questions, various approaches and standards have emerged,
many of which do not provide the privacy protections called for in
Riley to shield citizens from “general warrants.”58
The Nebraska Supreme Court first analyzed what is necessary to
establish probable cause59 and satisfy the particularity requirement60
in a cell phone search warrant post-Riley in State v. Henderson.61 In
this case, police were called to the scene after reports of a shooting.62
Witnesses told police they saw two men shooting at the victims, and
police, after observing two men “running from the scene,” initiated a
foot chase and apprehend Henderson.63 A search incident to his arrest
uncovered a handgun and a cell phone.64 Officer Schneider requested
a warrant to search the contents of Henderson’s cell phone. “As
grounds for the issuance of the warrant, Schneider asserted that Hen-
derson was a suspect in a shooting and that the cell phone was in
Henderson’s possession when he was arrested.”65 The county court for
vacy rights and a powerful check against the prying eyes of government”); Adam
Liptak, Major Ruling Shields Privacy of Cellphones, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/26/us/supreme-court-cellphones-search-pri-
vacy.html [https://perma.unl.edu/TS3W-EE47] (describing Riley v. California as
a “sweeping victory for privacy rights in the digital age”).
56. See Gershowitz, supra note 48, at 587 (discussing the widespread support for the
Riley decision among scholars after nearly a decade of calling on the Supreme
Court to ban warrantless cell phone searches incident to arrest and noting that
scholars believed the Riley decision was “recalibrating the balance between pri-
vacy and the needs of law enforcement”).
57. See State v. Henderson, 289 Neb. 271, 290, 854 N.W.2d 616, 633–34 (2014) (“The
parameters of how specific the scope of a warrant to search the contents of a cell
phone must be will surely develop in the wake of Riley v. California.”); see also
Gershowitz, supra note 48, at 600–01 (providing an initial overview of the issues
courts are having post-Riley with narrowing the scope of cell phone search war-
rants); Danielson, supra note 46, at 971–72 (explaining that “the Riley decision
fails to address what should be stated in a warrant application” to establish prob-
able cause and be sufficiently particular).
58. Clark, supra note 4, at 1983–84 (outlining the inconsistent, and in some cases,
inadequate standards that have emerged in the lower courts as they grapple with
the proper way to limit cell phone search warrants post-Riley).
59. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
60. See supra notes 36–40 and accompanying text.
61. Henderson, 289 Neb. 271, 854 N.W.2d 616.
62. Id. at 287, 854 N.W.2d at 631.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 277, 854 N.W.2d at 625.
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Douglas County issued the warrant, and Henderson filed a motion to
suppress the evidence obtained from the search of his cell phone on
the grounds that the warrant “did not contain sufficient information
to establish probable cause to believe a crime or evidence of a crime
would be found on [Henderson’s] cellular telephone.”66
Before the district court ruled on Henderson’s motion to suppress,
police submitted a revised affidavit and obtained a second search war-
rant for the cell phone from the county court.67 Again, Henderson filed
a motion to suppress the cell phone evidence on the same grounds.68
The district court agreed that the affidavit in support of the first war-
rant was not sufficient to establish probable cause because it “did not
sufficiently state why a search of the cell phone would produce evi-
dence relevant to the crimes for which Henderson was arrested.”69
However, because Riley had not yet been decided by the Supreme
Court, the district court held that the invalidity of the warrant did not
require suppression of the cell phone evidence; the search of the cell
phone was a valid warrantless search incident to arrest.70 The jury
found Henderson guilty on multiple charges, including first degree
murder, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment.71 In appealing
his conviction, Henderson claimed the district court erred in overrul-
ing his motion to suppress and admitting the evidence obtained from
the search of his cell phone.72
Henderson’s appeal was pending when the United States Supreme
Court decided Riley. Accordingly, the Nebraska Supreme Court ap-
plied the new Riley standard for cell phone search warrants.73 In do-
66. Id. at 277, 854 N.W.2d at 626 (alteration in original).
67. Id. at 277–78, 854 N.W.2d at 626. To prevent suppression of the evidence, officer
Schneider submitted a revised affidavit in attempt to more concretely establish
probable cause that evidence of a crime would be found on Henderson’s cell
phone. In the revised affidavit, there was additional language stating:
In Affiant Officers [sic] experience and training as a detective it is
known that suspects that we have had contact with use cell phones to
communicate about shootings that they have been involved it [sic],
before, during, and afterwards. The communication can be though [sic]
voice, text, and social media, to name a few.
Id. at 278, 854 N.W.2d at 626 (alteration in original).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. Because the court held no warrant was needed, it also did not address
whether the revised affidavit in support of the second warrant was sufficient to
establish probable cause to search the cell phone; the issue was moot. Id. How-
ever, after Henderson filed a motion to reconsider the ruling on the motion to
suppress, the court held the second search warrant was “properly issued and exe-
cuted” because the additional language in the affidavit “established probable
cause to search the cell phone.” Id. at 279, 854 N.W.2d at 626.
71. Id. at 282, 854 N.W.2d at 628.
72. Id. at 282, 854 N.W.2d at 628–29.
73. Id. at 285, 854 N.W.2d at 630.
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ing so, it held the district court’s ruling—that the search of
Henderson’s cell phone was a valid warrantless search incident to ar-
rest—was erroneous and, consequently, evaluated the validity of the
search warrant.74
First, the court analyzed whether the affidavits submitted by po-
lice were sufficient to establish probable cause for the searches.75 The
court held that the first warrant76 was supported by probable cause
because the affidavit alleged that (1) Henderson was a suspect in a
shooting; (2) Henderson was apprehended by police near the scene of
the crime after witnesses said two men shot at the victim; and (3) po-
lice found a cell phone in his pocket when he was arrested.77 Based on
these facts, the court held that the first warrant established probable
cause to search Henderson’s cell phone—it “established a fair
probability that Henderson was involved in the shootings” and that
“Henderson was working with at least one other person to commit the
shootings, [so] it is reasonable to infer that the cell phone that was in
his possession was used to communicate with others regarding the
shootings before, during, or after they occurred.”78 In other words, the
court found the first warrant established probable cause to search the
cell phone, even without the additional allegations presented in the
second affidavit that “cell phones are used in relation to crimes.”79
Once the court established the warrants were supported by proba-
ble cause, it analyzed whether the warrants were sufficiently particu-
lar.80 The court ultimately held the warrants were not sufficiently
particular because they did not state “the specific crime being investi-
74. Id. at 286, 854 N.W.2d at 631 (“[U]nder the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in
Riley, the district court erred when it concluded that the search of Henderson’s
cell phone was justified or necessitated as a search incident to arrest. Because a
search of the contents of Henderson’s cell phone required a warrant, we must
consider whether the evidence Henderson sought to be suppressed was obtained
in a search that was supported by a valid warrant.”). In holding a valid warrant
was required to search Henderson’s cell phone per Riley, the court noted there
were no exigent circumstances that would have authorized police to search the
contents of Henderson’s cell phone without obtaining a warrant. Id. at 285–86,
854 N.W.2d at 631. This was an important and necessary determination because
the Riley Court held that, while warrantless searches of cell phones incident to
arrest were unconstitutional, warrantless searches of cell phones could be valid
where there were compelling, exigent circumstances that made the search by law
enforcement objectively reasonable. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 401–02
(2014).
75. Henderson, 289 Neb. at 286–88, 854 N.W.2d at 631–32.
76. See supra text accompanying note 65.
77. Henderson, 289 Neb. at 286–88, 854 N.W.2d at 631–32.
78. Id. at 287–88, 854 N.W.2d at 632.
79. Id.; see also supra note 67. It naturally followed that the second warrant, which
was supported by an affidavit with these additional allegations, was also sup-
ported by probable cause. Id.
80. Henderson, 289 Neb. at 288–90, 854 N.W.2d at 632–34.
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gated” nor did they sufficiently state “the type of information encom-
passed by their authorization.”81 Both warrants “listed types of data,
such as cell phone calls and text messages,” however, “they concluded
with a catchall phrase stating that they authorized a search of ‘any
other information that can be gained from the internal components
and/or memory Cards.’”82 By including this catchall phrase, the war-
rants were effectively general warrants that allowed law enforcement
to conduct a search that was limited in scope only by the discretion of
the officer serving the warrant (as opposed to being limited to content
that was related to the probable cause which justified the search as
required by the Fourth Amendment).83
In finding that the “any and all” catchall language violated the par-
ticularity requirement, the court relied in part on its decision in State
v. Sprunger,84 which addressed the validity of a warrant to search a
computer.85 In that case, a citizen reported that a fraudulent
purchase was made online with his credit card, and police traced the
IP address used to make the purchase back to the defendant.86 When
the defendant refused to let police take his computers, the police ob-
tained a warrant authorizing them to search for and seize “[a]ny and
all computer equipment.”87 After seizing the computers and learning
some additional facts, the police applied for, and the county court is-
sued, a second warrant to search the computers for “evidence of child
pornography.”88 Police ultimately found child pornography on the
81. Id. at 289–90, 854 N.W.2d at 633; see also Gershowitz, supra note 48, at 599–600
(discussing the primary reasons lower courts sustain particularity challenges for
cell phone search warrants, which include (1) “when the search warrant does not
state on its face what crime the search is being conducted to find evidence of,” and
(2) “when the search warrant contains overbroad, catch-all language”). The court
in Henderson, therefore, fell in line with other courts when it said the warrants
failed the particularity requirement on both of these grounds.
82. Henderson, 289 Neb. at 290, 854 N.W.2d at 633.
83. Id. at 289–90, 854 N.W.2d at 633–34 (“In the present case, because the search
warrants allowed a search of ‘[a]ny and all’ content, their scope was clearly not
sufficiently particular and therefore the warrants did not meet the Fourth
Amendment particularity requirement and were invalid for this reason.” (altera-
tion in original)).
84. State v. Sprunger, 283 Neb. 531, 811 N.W.2d 235 (2012).
85. Henderson, 289 Neb. at 288–89, 854 N.W.2d at 632–33 (“Given the privacy inter-
ests at stake in a search of a cell phone as acknowledged by the Court in Riley
and similar to our reasoning in Sprunger, we think that the Fourth Amendment’s
particularity requirement must be respected in connection with the breadth of a
permissible search of the contents of a cell phone.”).
86. Sprunger, 283 Neb. at 533, 811 N.W.2d at 239.
87. Id. at 534, 811 N.W.2d at 240 (alteration in original).
88. Id. During the execution of the first warrant, the defendant asked police if he
could delete things off of his computer before they were taken. Based solely on
this statement, police asked the defendant if he had child pornography on his
computer. Even though he replied that he did not, police still stated their suspi-
cions were raised. A few days later, police received a call from the defendant’s
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computer, and, after the district court denied the defendant’s motion
to suppress this evidence, Sprunger was convicted for possession of
child pornography.89
In reviewing the validity of the warrants, the Sprunger court held
both warrants were invalid because they lacked probable cause and
particularity.90 Ultimately, the court emphasized that in the age of
advancing technology, it is “all the more important” that police partic-
ularly describe what they are looking for and establish probable cause
that what they are looking for could be found on the device.91 Defend-
ing this assertion, the court stated:
“[T]he modern development of the personal computer and its ability to store
and intermingle a huge array of one’s personal papers in a single place in-
creases law enforcement’s ability to conduct a wide-ranging search into a per-
son’s private affairs.” It thus makes the particularity and probable cause
requirements all the more important.92
Relying on this strong statement about the importance of protect-
ing computers from general searches, the court in Henderson held that
the particularity requirement must be equally respected and enforced
to limit the scope of cell phone search warrants, espeically since cell
phones function as “ ‘a digital record of nearly every aspect of their
[owners’] lives,’ and their ability to ‘access data located elsewhere.’”93
Therefore, the warrants in Henderson’s case, which authorized law
enforcement to search “any and all” information, violated the particu-
larity requirement—they were not “sufficiently limited in scope to al-
low a search of only that content that is related to the probable cause
that justifies the search.”94
lawyer. The lawyer stated that his client had told him his computers were taken
by police to search for child pornography. It was these facts that police used in
their affidavit for the second warrant to assert there was probable cause child
pornography would be found on the computer. Id.
89. Id. at 535–36, 811 N.W.2d at 240–41.
90. Id. at 540–41, 811 N.W.2d at 243–44 (“Based only on the fact that Sprunger
wanted to delete some files, the deputies could never say with particularity what
it was that they wanted to seize. They had no idea what files Sprunger might
have wanted to delete. How could the deputies have had probable cause to believe
that what they were looking for would be found on his computers when they did
not even know what they were looking for? . . . Summed up, the call from
Sprunger’s attorney to the deputies established nothing more than that the dep-
uty had made an offhand remark that led Sprunger to believe he was being inves-
tigated for child pornography. And Sprunger’s desire to delete some files does not
mean that any particular evidence would be found. Taken together, there was no
probable cause to support the warrant.”).
91. Id. at 540–41, 811 N.W.2d at 244.
92. Id. (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Mink v. Knox, 613 F.3d
995, 1010 (10th Cir. 2010)).
93. State v. Henderson, 289 Neb. 271, 289, 854 N.W.2d 616, 633 (2014) (alteration in
original) (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 375, 397 (2014)).
94. Id. at 289, 854 N.W.2d at 633.
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Despite finding that the search warrants for Henderson’s cell
phone were invalid, the court upheld the search of his cell phone
under the good faith exception.95 “[T]he warrants were carried out in
good faith,” so “the district court did not err when it overruled the
motions to suppress or when it admitted evidence obtained from the
search over Henderson’s Fourth Amendment objections.”96 Problemat-
ically, the court did not outline what police need to include in future
cell phone search warrants to comply with the particularity require-
ment. As a result, the court provided law enforcement with guidance
on what an invalid warrant looked like but did not outline what was
required for cell phone search warrants to be sufficiently particular
under the Fourth Amendment.97
C. Nebraska’s Current Approach to Cell Phone Search
Warrants: State v. Goynes
After Henderson, the Nebraska Supreme Court did not hear an-
other constitutional challenge to a cell phone search warrant until
95. The exclusionary rule may keep evidence out when the Fourth Amendment is
violated, however, “[t]he Fourth Amendment contains no provision expressly pre-
cluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands.” Id. at 291, 854
N.W.2d at 634. “The good faith exception provides that evidence seized under an
invalid warrant need not be suppressed when police officers act in objectively
reasonable good faith in reliance upon the warrant.” Id. Whether the officers’ ac-
tions were objectively reasonable depends on “ ‘whether a reasonably well-trained
officer would have known that the search was illegal despite a magistrate’s au-
thorization.’” Id. (quoting Sprunger, 283 Neb. at 542, 811 N.W.2d at 245). Since
there was no indication that the officers in Henderson’s case “would reasonably
have known of the defects in the warrants as authorized” and the police did not
use “the warrant to conduct a search for evidence other than that related to the
shootings investigation,” the court held it was executed in good faith. Id. at
291–92, 854 N.W.2d at 634–35. The court recognized the warrants were not suffi-
ciently particular; however, since they “contained references to specific items,”
they were not “so facially deficient” that reasonably well-trained officers would
have known they violated the particularity requirement. Id. at 292, 854 N.W.2d
at 635.
96. Id.
97. Since the court in Henderson held the catchall language to search “any and all”
content on the cell phone failed to satisfy the particularity requirement, law en-
forcement could not expect to use this language again and rely on the good faith
exception to “save” the evidence. Once officers had a ruling from the court that
such language was insufficient, it could be easily established that a reasonably
well-trained officer would know that a search conducted using such a warrant
was illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization. The court held in Henderson
that “[o]fficers are assumed to ‘have a reasonable knowledge of what the law pro-
hibits.’” Id. at 291, 854 N.W.2d at 634 (quoting Sprunger, 283 Neb. at 542, 811
N.W.2d at 245). Therefore, after Henderson, officers were assumed to know that a
warrant authorizing the search of “any and all” content on a cell phone was inva-
lid but did not have guidance from the court as to what language would make a
warrant sufficiently particular.
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State v. Goynes.98 On April 25, 2016, police were dispatched to an
Omaha apartment complex after receiving reports that shots had been
fired.99 An investigation ensued and ultimately led to police arresting
Michael Goynes five days after the incident.100 Goynes had a cell
phone in his possession when he was taken into custody.101
To establish probable cause to search Goynes’s cell phone, police
submitted an affidavit alleging eyewitnesses had seen Goynes exit a
white sedan, fire shots at the victim, and return to the sedan, which
then sped off.102 The witnesses also stated they saw additional parties
in the sedan but that none of them exited the vehicle.103 The wit-
nesses could not definitively state, however, whether Goynes was driv-
ing the sedan or was a passenger.104 The witnesses’ recollection of the
incident was corroborated by video evidence from the crime scene, but
the video was not clear enough to identify the shooter.105
In addition to alleging these facts to establish probable cause
Goynes was the shooter, police attempted to assert facts that would
specifically justify the search of his cell phone and extraction of his
electronically stored information.106 First, the investigating officer
“stated his belief that data from the cell phone would assist him in
determining the course of events regarding the homicide investiga-
tion.”107 The officer’s explanation of why he believed evidence of the
crime would be found on Goynes’s cell phone was similar to the ge-
neric language used by officers in the Henderson warrant.108 The war-
rant stated:
From training, experience and research Affiant Officer is aware that the data
on cell phones can provide invaluable insight for criminal investigations. Cell
phones are used for communication, access to information, socialization, re-
search, entertainment, shopping and other functionality. In addition to per-
sonal use, cell phones are often used as tools in criminal activity. Affiant
Officer is aware of numerous instances where cell phones were used by par-
ticipants in crimes to communicate via voice and text messaging, occasions
98. State v. Goynes, 303 Neb. 129, 927 N.W.2d 346 (2019).
99. Id. at 131, 927 N.W.2d at 349.
100. Id. Goynes was charged with “murder in the first degree, use of a deadly weapon
(firearm) to commit a felony, and possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited
person.” Id. at 135, 927 N.W.2d at 351.
101. Id. at 131, 927 N.W.2d at 349.
102. Id. at 132–34, 927 N.W.2d at 349–51.
103. Id. at 132–33, 927 N.W.2d at 350 (“Taylor indicated that he saw additional par-
ties inside the white sedan, but that those individuals did not exit the sedan.”).
104. Id. at 132–34, 927 N.W.2d at 349–51 (explaining that one eyewitness said the
shooter got in “the driver’s side of the sedan,” another stated that he took cover
and did not see Goynes get back into the sedan, and the last eyewitness said she
saw Goynes exit from the “rear driver’s side seat” but did not specify where he got
back in once he was fleeing).
105. Id. at 132, 927 N.W.2d at 350.
106. Id. at 131, 927 N.W.2d at 349.
107. Id.
108. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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when they took photographs of themselves with weapons and/or illegal narcot-
ics, times when they created videos of their criminal activity and instances
when the Internet was used to research crimes they participated in, just to
name a few. As such a cell phone can serve both as an instrument for commit-
ting a crime, as well as a storage medium for evidence of the crime.
Cell phone data can assist investigators in determining the culpability of par-
ticipants in criminal investigations. This is because the data can potentially
provide a wealth of information that can assist in determining the motivation,
method and participants involved in an incident. Information on the devices
can provide invaluable insight to the who, what, when, where and why an
incident occurred.109
In the warrant, officers also listed the types of data to be searched and
extracted:
[C]ell phone information, configurations, calendar events, notes, and user ac-
count information which could identify who owns or was using a cell phone;
call logs which could establish familiarity between people involved and time-
lines of an incident; short and multimedia messaging service messages, chat
and instant messages, and emails which could provide insight to establish an
individual’s level of culpability and knowledge of the incident; installed appli-
cation data which could aid in determining a user’s historical geographic loca-
tion and demonstrate the user’s association with investigated people, location,
and events; media files such as images, videos, audio, and documents which
could provide times and locations, as well as firsthand documentation of the
incident; internet browsing history which could demonstrate the planning, de-
sire, and participation in a crime; cell tower connections, global positioning
system data, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, and synchronization logs which could provide
information on location in relation to the incident; and user dictionary infor-
mation which could demonstrate familiarity with the crime being
investigated.110
Based on this language, Goynes filed a pre-trial motion to suppress
“all evidence obtained from the search of his cell phone records,” argu-
ing the search violated the Fourth Amendment.111
The district court held a hearing on the motion to suppress, and
the officer who requested and executed the warrant testified.112 Dur-
ing cross-examination the officer agreed the following was true:
[T]he witnesses described in the affidavits did not provide any information or
evidence that the shooter was using a cell phone in the minutes immediately
preceding or after the shooting, that the shooter communicated about the
shooting over his cell phone, that the shooter took photographs or video of the
shooting, or that the shooter communicated about the shooting on social
media.113
The district court overruled Goynes’s motion to suppress, holding the
warrant was supported by probable cause and was sufficiently partic-
ular.114 During the trial, the prosecution inadvertently offered evi-
109. Goynes, 303 Neb. at 134, 927 N.W.2d at 351.
110. Id. at 142–43, 927 N.W.2d at 356.
111. Id. at 135, 927 N.W.2d at 351.
112. Id. at 135, 927 N.W.2d at 351–52.
113. Id. at 135–36, 927 N.W.2d at 352.
114. Id. at 136, 927 N.W.2d at 352.
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dence which showed Goynes did not make any calls, send any text
messages, or do any internet browsing shortly before, during, or after
the shooting.115 At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Goynes
“guilty of all counts,” and he was sentenced to life in prison.116
On appeal, Goynes argued the district court erred in overruling his
motion to suppress and admitting the evidence extracted from his cell
phone.117 The court ultimately held that the district court did not err
when it overruled Goynes’s motion to suppress because the warrant to
search his cell phone “was supported by probable cause and met the
particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”118 To reach its
conclusion that the warrant for Goynes’s cell phone was constitu-
tional, the court analyzed two issues. First, the court had to decide
whether finding a cell phone on the suspect incident to arrest, coupled
with an officer’s opinion that cell phones typically have information
relevant to criminal investigations, was sufficient to establish proba-
ble cause to search the cell phone.119 Second, the court had to decide if
the warrant’s extensive list of data and applications to be searched
was sufficiently particular.120
The court held the warrant to search Goynes’s cell phone and seize
its content was supported by probable cause.121 The court applied
Henderson and noted a similar factual basis that established probable
115. See id. (“According to the data contained in these exhibits, Goynes used the in-
ternet throughout the morning and early afternoon on April 25, 2016. Notably,
Goynes repeatedly accessed Facebook between 3:38 and 4:19 p.m. and then
stopped. There were no cell phone calls, text messages, or internet browsing his-
tory between 4:19 and 5:08 p.m. that day. At 5:08 p.m., Goynes again began ac-
cessing Facebook and, at 5:10 p.m., visited the website of a local television news
station and viewed an article about the shooting before returning to Facebook.”).
The prosecution likely found this gap in his cell phone usage significant since the
shooting occurred shortly before 4:25 p.m. on April 25, 2016.
116. Id. at 137, 927 N.W.2d at 352 (“Goynes was sentenced to life imprisonment for
murder in the first degree, 45 to 50 years’ imprisonment for use of a deadly
weapon (firearm) to commit a felony, and 20 to 25 years’ imprisonment for posses-
sion of a deadly weapon by a prohibited person.”).
117. Id. at 137, 927 N.W.2d at 352–53. In assessing the merit of Goynes’s appeal, the
court applied a two-part standard of review. “Regarding historical facts, an appel-
late court reviews the trial court’s findings for clear error, but whether those facts
trigger or violate Fourth Amendment protections is a question of law that an
appellate court reviews independently of the trial court’s determination.” Id. at
137, 927 N.W.2d at 353.
118. Id. at 145, 927 N.W.2d at 357; see also Aaron Hegarty, Nebraska Supreme Court:
Cellphone Records Used in 2016 Murder Case Were Admissible, OMAHA WORLD-
HERALD (May 17, 2019), https://www.omaha.com/news/courts/nebraska-supreme-
court-cellphone-records-used-in-murder-case-were/article_697a6474-90de-5456-
b876-4b1f53f14514.html [https://perma.unl.edu/D7W8-BHAA] (discussing the
court’s ruling and affirmation of Goynes’s sentence).
119. Goynes, 303 Neb. at 138–41, 927 N.W.2d at 353–55.
120. Id. at 141–44, 927 N.W.2d at 355–57.
121. Id. at 141, 927 N.W.2d at 355.
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cause—in both cases, “there was a fair probability that the defendant
. . . was involved in the shootings and . . . he had a cell phone in his
possession when he was taken into custody shortly after the shoot-
ings.”122 Further, as in Henderson, witnesses told police that Goynes
was with other individuals during the commission of the crime.123
These facts, coupled with the officer’s assertions that “individuals who
committed similar crimes commonly communicate, research, record,
and perform other operations on their cell phones that would amount
to evidence of the crime,” were, according to the court, sufficient to
support the finding that probable cause existed to search Goynes’s cell
phone.124 The court noted this finding was limited in that “the content
of the affidavit pertaining to how suspects use cell phones standing
alone may not always be sufficient probable cause.”125
Next, the court outlined why the warrant was sufficiently particu-
lar.126 The court distinguished Goynes from Henderson, noting that
the Henderson warrants were insufficiently particular because (1)
they failed to refer to the crime police were investigating, and (2) be-
cause “by including such a catchall phrase as ‘any other information,’
a warrant fails to set parameters for the search of this substantial
device and limit the search to only that content that is related to the
probable cause justifying the search.”127 The court went on to say that
Henderson does not prohibit expansive, and in some cases, perhaps
even unlimited searches.128 Contrary to Goynes’s objections—that the
list of areas to be searched on his phone was virtually a search of any
and all information—the court held the warrant was sufficiently par-
ticular because, unlike Henderson, it stated that police were investi-
gating a homicide and “listed specific areas to be searched within the
cell phone.”129 Thus, the court held the warrant met the Fourth
Amendment requirements and affirmed the district court’s
judgment.130
122. Id. at 140–41, 927 N.W.2d at 354–55.
123. Id. at 141, 927 N.W.2d at 355.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 141–44, 927 N.W.2d at 355–57.
127. Id. at 143–44, 927 N.W.2d at 356–57.
128. Id. at 143, 927 N.W.2d at 356 (“Henderson does not stand for the rule that a
search of a cell phone cannot be expansive; instead, we held that the unlimited
search of the cell phone in that case did not align with the justifying probable
cause.”).
129. Id. at 144, 927 N.W.2d at 357.
130. Id. at 145, 927 N.W.2d at 357.
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III.  ANALYSIS
A. Shortcomings of the Goynes Decision
1. Essential Eradication of Probable Cause Requirement
In finding the warrant to search Goynes’s cell phone was supported
by probable cause, the court held that the police affidavit provided suf-
ficient evidence to establish a fair probability that evidence of the
shooting would be on the cell phone.131 This finding is problematic
given the generic nature of the “evidence” provided in the affidavit.132
Besides noting Goynes was a suspect in the shooting and that he had a
cell phone when police arrested him five days after the incident, police
did not provide any evidence specific to Goynes that established a fair
probability that evidence of the shooting was on his phone.133 At the
motion to suppress hearing, officers admitted they had no evidence
that Goynes used a cell phone before, during, or immediately after the
shooting to plan, discuss, or record the crime.134 None of the witnesses
even reported seeing a cell phone in his possession at the time of the
shooting.135
Instead, the affidavit relied almost exclusively on the investigating
officer’s opinion that (1) cell phone data “can potentially provide a
wealth of information that can assist in determining the motivation,
method and participants involved in an incident,” and (2) that the of-
ficer was aware of “numerous instances” where criminals used cell
phones to discuss and document criminal activity.136 In essence, the
officer opined—and the court affirmed—that if someone is suspected
of a crime and owns a cell phone, there is a fair probability that evi-
dence of the crime exists on the cell phone (even if there is absolutely
no particularized evidence that the suspect used the phone to plan,
discuss, or document the alleged criminal activity). Thus, an officer’s
unsupported suspicion is sufficient to find a nexus “between the item
to be seized and criminal behavior.”137 In creating this standard, the
court virtually eradicated the requirement for probable cause in cell
phone search warrants. This is especially true given the officer’s opin-
ion was not that it was probable evidence of the crime was on the sus-
131. Id. at 139, 927 N.W.2d at 353 (“Probable cause sufficient to justify issuance of a
search warrant means a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime
will be found.”).
132. See supra text accompanying notes 122–24.
133. Goynes, 303 Neb. at 140–41, 927 N.W.2d at 355.
134. See supra text accompanying note 113.
135. Goynes, 303 Neb. at 132–34, 927 N.W.2d at 349–51.
136. Id. at 134, 927 N.W.2d at 351 (emphasis added).
137. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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pect’s cell phone, but only that a cell phone can potentially provide
information useful to investigations.138
Likely recognizing this standard was overly broad, the court un-
successfully attempted to limit the scope of its application. After de-
ciding the warrant was supported by probable cause, the court
qualified its statement by noting:
Although the content of the affidavit pertaining to how suspects use cell
phones standing alone may not always be sufficient probable cause, when con-
sidered with all of the facts recited above, as we determined in Henderson, the
affidavit provided a substantial basis to find probable cause existed to search
the cell phone data.139
However, in Goynes, the only fact alleged in addition to the officer’s
opinion that “suspects use cell phones” (and that Goynes was a sus-
pect with a cell phone) was that witnesses had seen other individuals
in the sedan with Goynes before he exited the vehicle and fired
shots.140 Accordingly, the court held that an officer’s opinion that
“suspects use cell phones” is sufficient to establish probable cause to
search a suspect’s cell phone in any case where there is evidence that
other individuals accompanied a suspect to the crime scene.
In attempt to further justify the lack of facts particular to Goynes
necessary to establish probable cause that evidence of the crime ex-
isted on his cell phone, the court attempted to analogize its finding
with its holding in Henderson.141 The affidavit in Henderson, how-
ever, alleged significantly different, case-specific facts in addition to
the officer’s opinion that “suspects use cell phones,” creating a
stronger (but arguably still insufficient) nexus between the cell phone
and the crime. First, in Henderson, when police were dispatched to the
location where shots had been fired, witnesses stated they saw “two
men firing at a victim.”142 One officer noticed “two men running from
the scene.”143 While chasing one of the men, later identified as Hen-
derson, the officer saw him throw a gun under a vehicle.144 When po-
138. Goynes, 303 Neb. at 134, 927 N.W.2d at 351; see also infra note 175 (explaining
that a possibility evidence may exist is not sufficient to establish probable cause).
139. Goynes, 303 Neb. at 141, 927 N.W.2d at 355.
140. Id. at 140–41, 927 N.W.2d at 355 (“In the instant case, Goynes had the cell phone
in his possession at the time he was taken into custody and the affidavit estab-
lished it was a fair probability that Goynes had committed the shooting. There
were additionally witness accounts summarized in the affidavit that described
Goynes’ [sic] committing the shooting with the aid of one or more other people,
and Cahill described how, in his experience as an investigator, individuals who
committed similar crimes commonly communicate, research, record, and perform
other operations on their cell phones that would amount to evidence of the
crime.”).
141. Id. at 140–41, 927 N.W.2d at 354–55.
142. State v. Henderson, 289 Neb. 271, 287, 854 N.W.2d 616, 631 (2014).
143. Id.
144. Id.
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lice apprehended Henderson, they found a cell phone in his pocket.145
Given these circumstances, police knew Henderson had the cell phone
with him at the time of the shooting and that he had conspired with
an accomplice to commit the crime.
These additional facts in Henderson—which may indicate a nexus
between the cell phone and the crime—were not present in Goynes,
making the inference that evidence of the crime would be located on
Goynes’s cell phone much weaker. In Henderson, police knew from
witness statements that two individuals had shot at the victim.146
Since it is highly unlikely two individuals coincidentally started firing
shots at the same person at the same time, there is some indication
that the individuals who fired the guns had planned the shooting
before it happened. This makes it more likely that cell phone commu-
nication occurred between Henderson and the other suspect before,
during, or after the shooting.147
Conversely, witnesses told police that Goynes was the only person
who fired a gun at the victim on the day of the homicide.148 Without
further evidence, it is possible the other individuals in the vehicle with
Goynes on the day of the shooting did not know what he intended to do
when he exited the vehicle, and that they simply rode off with him
afterward out of shock. In other words, there is no evidence Goynes
conspired or communicated with these individuals before the incident
about his plan to shoot the victim. Neither the witnesses nor the video
surveillance provided any insight into who was driving the vehicle,
meaning there is also no evidence that someone other than Goynes
acted as an accomplice by driving away from the scene of a crime.
Further, since police found the cell phone on Henderson when he
was apprehended briefly after the shooting and a short distance from
the crime scene, it was reasonable to infer that communications with
his alleged accomplice would be found on that cell phone.149 On the
other hand, police did not arrest Goynes until five days after the shoot-
ing.150 Therefore, even if Goynes had a cell phone with him on the day
of the shooting (which there was no evidence of when the court consid-
ered the motion to suppress), there is no evidence that the cell phone
seized by police was the one Goynes had with him on the day of the
incident. Given these facts, there was not probable cause to believe
police would find evidence of the crime on Goynes’s cell phone. At
most, there was a slight possibility.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 288, 854 N.W.2d at 632 (“[I]t is reasonable to infer that the cell phone that
was in his possession was used to communicate with others regarding the shoot-
ings before, during, or after they occurred.”).
148. State v. Goynes, 303 Neb. 129, 132–34, 927 N.W.2d 346, 349–51 (2019).
149. Henderson, 289 Neb. at 287–88, 854 N.W.2d at 631–32.
150. Goynes, 303 Neb. at 131, 927 N.W.2d at 349.
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These distinct factual differences between Henderson and Goynes
emphasize that, without the officer’s opinion that suspects use cell
phones, the nexus between the cell phone and the crime in Goynes’s
case was virtually non-existent. The only other facts the court used to
conclude there was a fair probability police would find evidence of the
shooting on Goynes’s cell phone were: (1) Goynes was a suspect; (2)
Goynes possessed a cell phone five days after the incident; and (3)
Goynes arrived at the scene of the crime with other individuals who
did not participate in the commission of the crime.151 As stated above,
if this is all that is necessary to establish probable cause, then courts
will be hard-pressed to find a situation where probable cause to search
a suspect’s cell phone does not exist. This effectively eradicates the
probable cause requirement for cell phone search warrants.
Other courts across the country have recognized the danger of al-
lowing an officer’s general opinion that “suspects use cell phones” to
support a finding of probable cause to search a cell phone. For exam-
ple, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that an officer’s opin-
ion—that based on training and experience, evidence of a crime can
often be found on a cell phone—was insufficient to establish probable
cause, even when the defendant was a suspect in a multi-perpetrator
crime and officers knew he owned a cell phone.152 The court pointed to
the fact that officers had “no information that the cellular telephone
had been used to plan, commit, or cover up the crime, or that it con-
tained any evidence of the crime.”153 The court reasoned that “it
would be a rare case where probable cause to charge someone with a
crime would not open the person’s cellular telephone to seizure and
subsequent search” if these facts alone were sufficient to establish
probable cause —a result which is contrary to the significant privacy
interests that individuals have in cell phones.154
151. Id. at 140–41, 927 N.W.2d at 355.
152. Commonwealth v. White, 59 N.E.3d 369, 376 (Mass. 2016) (“Here, prior to seizing
the defendant’s cellular telephone, police had received information that the rob-
bery and homicide under investigation had been committed by several people,
that the defendant likely was one of those people, and that he owned a cellular
telephone. They also knew from experience that coventurers often use cellular
telephones to communicate with each other, and that these devices may contain
evidence of such communications. . . . This, without more, does not satisfy the
nexus requirement.”).
153. Id. at 371. The court concluded that, at most, police suspected the defendant had
used his phone to plan or communicate about the crime and that was insufficient.
Id. at 376. The court stated, “While probable cause may be based in part on police
expertise . . . such considerations do ‘not, alone, furnish the requisite nexus be-
tween the criminal activity and the places to be searched.’” Id. (citation omitted)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Anthony, 883 N.E.2d 918, 928 (Mass. 2008)).
154. Id. at 377.
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Other courts have also held that an officer’s suspicions are not suf-
ficient to establish probable cause to search a suspect’s cell phone.155
In these cases, as in Goynes, the only evidence officers used to estab-
lish probable cause was: (1) the defendant was a suspect in a multi-
perpetrator crime; (2) the defendant had a cell phone on him when he
was arrested; and (3) from officer training and experience, law en-
forcement had reason to believe evidence of the crime may be found on
the suspect’s phone.156 Unlike these courts, however, the Nebraska
Supreme Court held these facts created a sufficient nexus between the
cell phone and the crime.157 In doing so, the Nebraska Supreme Court
authorized the type of “bare-boned affidavit” other courts have warned
against.158 Based on this precedent, whenever individuals are ar-
rested as suspects in an alleged multi-perpetrator crime, police will
have probable cause to search any cell phones in their possession at
155. See, e.g., United States v. Tirado, No. 16-CR-168, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65321,
at *49–50 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 26, 2018) (holding that a warrant to search cell phones
found on a suspect a week after a retail theft incident was not supported by prob-
able cause). The court in this case stated:
The affidavit establishes that photos from the surveillance video were
used to identify Dumas. It also establishes that Dumas was arrested and
that when he was arrested he was in possession of the two cell phones.
But the bare-boned affidavit woefully fails to connect the two cell phones
with the commission of the retail theft and disorderly conduct. Recall
that Dumas was arrested one week after the theft. Nothing in the affida-
vit suggests that he was in possession of the cell phones during the com-
mission of the retail theft and disorderly conduct, or that he used the cell
phones during the commission of the offenses. There must be some
nexus between the items to be searched and the commission of the crime.
A mere boilerplate recitation about the use and features of cell phones is
not enough. Otherwise being arrested for anything, including minor vio-
lations of the law, would always provide probable cause to search one’s
cell phone regardless of any connection between the violation arrested
for and the cell phone. The law requires more.
Id.; see also Buckham v. State, 185 A.3d 1, 17–18 (Del. 2018) (footnotes omitted)
(“Buckham is right that many of the allegations in the warrant application are
too vague and too general to connect his cell phone to the shooting. Particularly
unpersuasive was the statement that ‘criminals often communicate through cel-
lular phones’ (who doesn’t in this day and age?) . . . Nor do we see much signifi-
cance in the statement that ‘Buckham was making posts on social media about
getting arrested’ while he was at-large. By that time, an arrest warrant had been
issued for him; the fact that Buckham may have been using his phone to talk
about his impending arrest connects his phone to the arrest warrant, not the
underlying crime. Even with the deference we owe to a magistrate’s probable
cause finding, these sorts of generalized suspicions do not provide a substantial
basis to support a probable cause finding.”).
156. See Goynes, 303 Neb. at 140–41, 927 N.W.2d at 355; see also supra notes 152 and
155 and accompanying text (discussing the cases where courts found these facts
insufficient to create a nexus between the crime and the cell phone).
157. Goynes, 303 Neb. at 140–41, 927 N.W.2d at 355.
158. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
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the time of arrest, regardless of any connection between the commis-
sion of the crime and the cell phone.
2. Substituting Particularity for General Searches of Cell
Phones
The court also erred in holding that the search warrant in Goynes
was sufficiently particular. Even if the court believed there was proba-
ble cause to search Goynes’s cell phone,159 this limited probable cause
did not justify the expansive scope of the warrant.160 In finding the
warrant in Goynes was sufficiently particular, the court attempted to
distinguish the warrant language161 from that in Henderson.162 Spe-
cifically, the court relied on the fact that the Henderson warrant au-
thorized a search of “any and all” information on the cell phone, while
the warrant in Goynes “listed specific areas to be searched within the
cell phone . . . along with a description of the information they held
which would be relevant to the investigation.”163 Goynes contested
this distinction, arguing the warrant in his case was comparable in
scope to the one rejected by the court in Henderson.164
The warrant  in Goynes was not sufficiently limited in scope be-
cause “the areas which the warrant permitted to be searched encom-
passed the entirety of the data contained within the cell phone.”165
Although the warrant did not explicitly state officers could search
“any and all” data on the cell phone, which, again, is prohibited by
Henderson,166 the laundry list of places to be searched effectively au-
thorized officers to search the entirety of the phone.167 In fact, the
warrant authorized the search of call logs, text messages, chat
messages, emails, notes, calendar information, images, videos, audio,
documents, internet browsing history, user dictionary information,
cell tower connections, GPS data, and “installed applications and their
corresponding data.”168 In this way, the court authorized officers to
159. See supra subsection III.A.1 (arguing there was no basis for the court to find the
warrant was supported by probable cause).
160. See supra text accompanying notes 40 and 94.
161. See supra text accompanying note 110.
162. See supra text accompanying note 81.
163. State v. Goynes, 303 Neb. 129, 144, 927 N.W.2d 346, 357 (2019).
164. Id. at 143, 927 N.W.2d at 356 (“Goynes argues the scope of the search authorized
in the warrant was too broad and was similar to warrants we determined did not
meet the particularity requirement in Henderson.”).
165. Id.
166. State v. Henderson, 289 Neb. 271, 290, 854 N.W.2d 616, 634 (2014).
167. See supra text accompanying note 110.
168. Goynes, 303 Neb. at 134–35, 927 N.W.2d at 351. Although the warrant affidavit
stated that police would search installed application information that could pro-
vide insight into the suspect’s “historical geographic location and demonstrate
the user’s association with investigated people, location, and events,” the warrant
itself did not limit which applications could be searched. Id. at 134–35, 142, 927
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rely on a technicality—listing every part of the cell phone instead of
stating “any and all data”—to skirt the important principles of partic-
ularity outlined in Henderson.169 By authorizing a warrant that al-
lowed police to search the entirety of Goynes’s cell phone, the court
created precedent that allows general searches of cell phones contrary
to the Fourth Amendment.
In addition to the areas of the phone listed on the search warrant
being exhaustive, there are clearly parts of the phone listed that could
not reasonably contain any content related to the probable cause for
searching the phone170 (that Goynes was a suspect in a shooting and
possibly planned the shooting with others).171 Specifically, even if of-
ficers knew that “individuals who committed similar crimes commonly
communicate, research, record, and perform other operations on their
cell phones that would amount to evidence of the crime,”172 this did
not establish a reasonable probability that police could find evidence
of the shooting on all of Goynes’s applications173 or in logs of his calls
and messages from months or years in the past (which could include
N.W.2d at 351, 355–56. Even if it could be argued the warrant only authorized
police to search applications that could track Goynes’s geographic data or demon-
strate his association with people, that would hardly limit the applications police
could search. See Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Natasha Singer, Michael H. Keller
& Aaron Krolik, Your Apps Know Where You Were Last Night, and They’re Not
Keeping It Secret, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interac-
tive/2018/12/10/business/location-data-privacy-apps.html [https://perma.unl.edu/
R4UZ-R378] (“More than 1,000 popular apps contain location-sharing code from
such companies, according to 2018 data from MightySignal, a mobile analysis
firm.”). Additionally, any social or gaming application, such as Facebook,
Snapchat, Words with Friends, Candy Crush, etc., could all arguably demon-
strate a user’s association with certain individuals. Overall, when this board lan-
guage is taken into consideration with the other areas of the cell phone listed in
the warrant, the installed application clause acts as a catchall, ensuring law en-
forcement can search every part of the phone.
169. Henderson, 289 Neb. at 288–89, 854 N.W.2d at 632–33 (holding “the privacy in-
terests at stake in a search of a cell phone” are so important that unfettered
searches of cell phone data exceed the permissible scope of a search allowed by
the Fourth Amendment).
170. Id. at 289, 854 N.W.2d at 633 (“[A] warrant for the search of the contents of a cell
phone must be sufficiently limited in scope to allow a search of only that content
that is related to the probable cause that justifies the search.”).
171. Goynes, 303 Neb. at 140–41, 927 N.W.2d at 355.
172. Id. at 141, 927 N.W.2d at 355.
173. See In re The Search of Premises Known as: A Nextel Cellular Tel. with Belong-
ing to & Seized from, No. 14-MJ-8005-DJW, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88215, at
*41–42 (D. Kan. June 26, 2014) (“[P]robable cause to believe drug trafficking com-
munication may be found in phone’s the [sic] mail application will not support the
search of the phone’s Angry Birds application. The Fourth Amendment would not
allow such a warrant and should therefore not permit a similarly overly broad
warrant just because the information sought is in electronic form rather than at a
residence.”).
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conversations with hundreds of different people).174 Still, all of these
areas of the cell phone were within the scope of the warrant.
Given the lack of evidence linking the cell phone to the commission
of the crime, there was, at most, a possibility that evidence of the
shooting existed in Goynes’s call logs and messages between him and
those in the sedan. A possibility, however, does not create probable
cause.175 Conversely, based on what police knew, there was no indica-
tion that evidence of the shooting could be found on Goynes’s gaming
or social media applications or in his audio recordings, photos, or
videos.176 Since the warrant did not limit the search to areas of the
cell phone where officers had probable cause to believe evidence of the
shooting could be found, it was facially overbroad and violated the
Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement.177
B. Alternative Approach to Cell Phone Search Warrants
1. Probable Cause: Case-Specific Nexus Between Crime & Cell
Phone
Instead of relying almost exclusively on the officer’s opinion that
evidence of the shooting could possibly be found on Goynes’s cell
phone,178 the court should have looked to its precedent in Sprunger
and Prahin and required a showing of particularized facts demon-
strating a nexus between the shooting and the cell phone.179 Applying
this precedent, the Goynes court should have held there was no proba-
ble cause to support the warrant since there were no particularized
facts linking the phone officers found on Goynes five days after the
shooting to the shooting itself.180
174. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
175. See Gershowitz, supra note 48, at 609–10 (“[I]t is possible that a person could
hide a lawnmower in a bedroom. Yet, the ordinary search warrant for a lawn-
mower does not extend to bedrooms because while a ‘lawnmower could be in the
bedroom, [ ] there is no probable cause to believe that it is there.’” (alteration in
original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Long v. State, 132 S.W.3d 443, 453 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2004))).
176. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
177. See Clark, supra note 4, at 2008–10; see also Gershowitz, supra note 48, at
611–12 (arguing that if police only have probable cause to believe there would be
communications between the suspects on the phone, issuing a warrant for other
areas of the phone such as photos or videos goes against the particularity
requirement).
178. State v. Goynes, 303 Neb. 129, 139–41, 927 N.W.2d 346, 354–55 (2019); see also
subsection III.A.1 (outlining the lack of case-specific evidence in Goynes to estab-
lish probable cause and the court’s reliance on officers’ opinions).
179. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (outlining the legal requirement that
there be a nexus between the crime and the item to be searched to establish prob-
able cause).
180. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
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Moving forward, to uphold the sanctity of privacy and the protec-
tions provided by the Fourth Amendment, the Nebraska Supreme
Court should only uphold warrants where this nexus exists. For exam-
ple, in Goynes’s case, there could have arguably been a nexus between
his cell phone and the shooting if witnesses saw other individuals in
the sedan firing at the victim; if a witness saw Goynes talking or text-
ing on his cell phone shortly before or after the shooting; if Goynes
made social media posts about committing the shooting; if a witness
received a picture from Goynes where he was brandishing a gun
matching the description of the one used in the shooting; or if Goynes’s
alleged co-conspirators told police that they planned or discussed the
shooting over calls or texts.181 These types of particularized facts
would likely be sufficient to create a nexus between the phone and the
crime being investigated.
Requiring this type of case-specific nexus between the crime and
the cell phone is an approach already supported by some judges, in-
cluding United States Magistrate Judge David Waxse.182 In fact,
some courts have specifically discussed what the nexus between the
crime and the cell phone should look like, and the Nebraska Supreme
Court could look to these opinions for guidance. The Massachusetts
Supreme Court, for example, has a bright-line rule that opinions of
officers alone, without knowledge of “particularized evidence” related
to the crime, are insufficient to establish probable cause to search a
suspect’s cell phone.183 Other courts have followed similar reasoning
when holding that a defendant’s status as a suspect and the officers’
181. In some cases, there may also be probable cause to search a cell phone for GPS
location data. However, in Goynes, there were no alleged facts that established a
fair probability that GPS evidence on Goynes’s phone could place him at the loca-
tion of the shooting. This is because there was no evidence that Goynes had the
phone with him at the time of the shooting. See, e.g., United States v. Tirado, No.
16-CR-168, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65321, at *50–51 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 26, 2018)
(holding there was not probable cause to search the suspect’s cell phone for GPS
location data where there was no particularized evidence that (1) the defendant
had a cell phone on him at the time the robbery occurred, or (2) if he had a cell
phone during the robbery, it was the one he had on him when he was arrested
weeks later). “[A]lthough the probable cause bar is not high, it is more than an
open-ended possibility that a search will yield evidence of the crime under inves-
tigation.” Id.
182. David J. Waxse, Search Warrants for Cell Phones and Other Locations Where
Electronically Stored Information Exists: The Requirements for Warrants Under
the Fourth Amendment, 9 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 9 (2016).
183. Commonwealth v. White, 59 N.E.3d 369, 375 (Mass. 2016) (“[P]olice must first
obtain information that establishes the existence of some ‘particularized evi-
dence’ related to the crime. Only then, if police believe, based on training or expe-
rience, that this ‘particularized evidence’ is likely to be found on the device in
question, do they have probable cause to seize or search the device in pursuit of
that evidence.”). The court contrasted this case with, Commonwealth v. Dorelas,
43 N.E.3d 306 (Mass. 2016), in which it held there were particularized facts suffi-
cient to create a nexus between the cell phone and the crime.
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belief that the suspect’s cell phone contains evidence are insufficient
to establish a nexus.184 Although enforcing a particularized nexus
standard may require police to gather more information before they
can establish probable cause to search a cell phone, this is the type of
sacrifice the Fourth Amendment requires.185
2. Particularity: Specifying the “Apps” to Be Searched and
Content to Be Seized
Even when there is a nexus between the cell phone and the crime
sufficient to establish probable cause, the particularity requirement
must be strictly applied to ensure searches are limited to areas of the
cell phone where evidence related to the crime could actually be lo-
cated.186 A warrant like that in Goynes, which effectively authorizes
police to search every part of a cell phone, does not sufficiently limit
the scope of the search to prevent over-searching and over-seizing.187
The method proposed to resolve overbreadth issues is relatively sim-
ple: Courts should only authorize police to search applications in
which the particularized evidence articulated in the affidavit could
reasonably be located. Further, courts must limit searches of calls logs
and messages to an appropriate time frame based on the crime com-
mitted and only include communications between the suspect and peo-
ple who have been specifically connected to the underlying
investigation.188
For example, if a witness saw Goynes communicating on his cell
phone shortly before, during, or after the shooting (which could possi-
bly create probable cause to search his call and message logs), simply
listing all call logs and text messages as the places to be searched
would not be sufficiently particular. This could include thousands of
184. See, e.g., United States v. Oglesby, No. 4:18- CR-0626, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
71238, at *12–20 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 26, 2019); United States v. Ramirez, 180 F.
Supp. 3d 491, 494–96 (W.D. Ky. 2016).
185. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 401 (2014) (providing that constitu-
tional requirements must be upheld even if it makes the work of law enforcement
more burdensome because “[p]rivacy comes at a cost”); Waxse, supra note 182, at
11 (“This might entail more complicated affidavits and more research performed
by law enforcement agencies, but the privacy interests and vast amount of infor-
mation available on these digital devices requires it. The privacy interest in cell
phone data is critical.”).
186. See supra text accompanying note 94.
187. See supra subsection III.A.2.
188. See, e.g., Waxse, supra note 182, at 10 (“If officers, for example, want to search an
individual’s cell phone, they should cite the specific phone, specifically his text
messages, specifically between himself and a known possible co-conspirator, be-
cause they had an independent suspicion about a connection to that other con-
spirator. Specifying this level of detail prevents law enforcement from seeing the
individual’s mother’s health problems, his marriage issues, his children’s
problems in school, or his emails back and forth with his attorney.”).
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calls and text messages dating back years before the shooting, and
these communications could be with individuals completely unrelated
to the shooting such as Goynes’s grandparents, boss, or pastor.189 In-
stead, the scope of such a search should be limited to calls and
messages exchanged between Goynes and other alleged co-conspira-
tors during a reasonable time period before and after the shooting.
Although some scholars believe it is impossible for police to iden-
tify the parts of a cell phone that will contain relevant evidence in
advance of the search,190 cell phones are not like computers, which
allow suspects to easily hide evidence anywhere amongst files and
folders.191 Instead, cell phones contain applications that hold specific
types of data, and police should be able to identify, based on the partic-
ularized evidence sought, where in the phone such evidence could rea-
sonably be located.192 If this does not uncover the evidence, but
instead, reveals other places the data may be, nothing prohibits police
from securing a second warrant.193 Providing a clear answer to where
in the phone police can search would be a major step forward in
preventing overly broad searches while allowing law enforcement to
access relevant evidence.194
189. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
190. See Clark, supra note 4, at 2011 (“[I]t is impossible at a search’s outset to identify
the exact part of a cell phone’s internal storage containing relevant data . . . .”).
191. See Andrew D. Huynh, Note, What Comes After “Get a Warrant”: Balancing Par-
ticularity and Practicality in Mobile Device Search Warrants Post-Riley, 101 COR-
NELL L. REV. 187, 207 (2015) (“[O]ne of the biggest concerns in a traditional
computer search is that potentially incriminating evidence may be masked by an
innocuous file name or by modifying the file extension. But file names and exten-
sions are not so easily modified on a mobile device, because mobile operating sys-
tems are designed for ease of use and do not emphasize user-directed file
organization.” (footnotes omitted)).
192. See Gershowitz, supra note 48, at 632–33 (arguing that in cases where probable
cause “is limited to certain applications” judges should simply restrict searches to
certain applications).
193. See id. at 636 (“There is nothing revolutionary about suggesting that officers re-
turn to the magistrate to request a broader search warrant. . . . Subsequent war-
rants are already used with some frequency in traditional computer searches.”).
194. The top priority is for the court to adopt these minimal particularity require-
ments to protect citizens’ private data from generalized searches. Once the court
departs from the precedent established in Goynes and returns to strict enforce-
ment of the probable cause and particularity requirements for cell phone war-
rants, it may be necessary to evolve these requirements further. This could
include permitting courts to provide police officers with search protocols “specify-
ing how the search of digital data should be conducted,” as alluded to in Hender-
son. State v. Henderson, 289 Neb. 271, 290, 854 N.W.2d 616, 633 (2014). Search
protocols sometimes require law enforcement to provide a detailed methodology
to the judge about their data extraction process to ensure police only search evi-
dence related to the crime. For in-depth discussions on the benefits of search pro-
tocols, see Clark, supra note 4; Gershowitz, supra note 48, at 614–29; Huynh,
supra note 191. Since the constitutionality of such protocols is still widely de-
bated, however, it is critical that the court focus on adopting the protections sug-
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Founding Fathers drafted the Fourth Amendment to ensure
citizens would be protected from general searches.195 Although they
had invasions of physical property in mind, the Supreme Court has
declared, on numerous occasions, that the Fourth Amendment must
evolve to protect against unreasonable electronic invasions.196 With
the rapid advancement of cell phone technology and society’s ever-in-
creasing reliance on these devices,197 the Court in Riley correctly pro-
vided such protection by requiring law enforcement to secure a
warrant to search an arrestee’s cell phone.198
However, the Court’s monumental decision in Riley can only pro-
tect citizens from unreasonable cell phone searches if state courts
strictly adhere to Fourth Amendment principles when issuing and up-
holding warrants.199 Unfortunately, in Goynes, the Nebraska Su-
preme Court departed from these requirements when it upheld a
boilerplate warrant that was deficient of probable cause200 and insuf-
ficiently particular.201
This decision does not comply with the Fourth Amendment. Proba-
ble cause requires courts to find some nexus between the crime and
the cell phone beyond the simple fact that a suspect owns and uses a
cell phone.202 Further, the particularity requirement obligates courts
to sufficiently limit a search to areas of the cell phone where evidence
of the crime could reasonably be located.203 Failing to apply these
standards to cell phone search warrants renders the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Riley meaningless and leaves the privacy of Nebraska citi-
zens utterly unprotected.
gested in this Note that are not only clearly constitutional, but, in fact, necessary
for the court to preserve Nebraskans’ constitutional protections. For an introduc-
tion to the constitutionality debate surrounding search protocols, see Clark,
supra note 4, at 1992; Gershowitz, supra note 48, at 621–23.
195. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
196. See supra section II.B.
197. See supra section II.A.
198. See supra text accompanying note 50.
199. See supra section II.B.
200. See supra subsection III.A.1.
201. See supra subsection III.A.2.
202. See supra subsection III.B.1.
203. See supra subsection III.B.2.
